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need to improve their ability to provide intelligence products and information to coalition partners at the theater level. Intelligence sharing between our coalition partners has been hampered by a lack of connectivity with regard to dissemination 2 in a coalition environment, production of products at the U.S.-only level, and policies that limit the COCOM's ability to disclose or release information to coalition partners in a timely fashion. It is my contention that without an improvement in all three areas mentioned above, true interoperability at the operational level with our coalition partners will never be achieved from an intelligence perspective. And while a marked improvement in any one area would be viewed as a plus from a dissemination viewpoint, without a drastic improvement across the full spectrum of issues listed above, mutually supporting intelligence in a coalition environment will remain hampered.
The issue of intelligence sharing at the operational level is critical to the COCOM Commander due to our stated policy of fighting as a coalition and our ability to mutually support one another through intelligence sharing. The lack of responsive dissemination 1 Comment from JFCOM during AAR brief to NWC in March 2004, JULLS database pulls, AAR comments on JFCOM home page concerning OIF. Vietnam/Bosnia operations research and e-mail feedback from current COCOM FDOs, intelligence producers, managers, and planners. 2 Dissemination: The conveyance of intelligence in suitable form to agencies needing it, DIAM 59-1.
protocol impacts the commander's ability to engage with coalition intelligence members;
reduces our access and ability to leverage coalition intelligence products; and hampers our effectiveness working in a coalition environment. Current procedures, connectivity and collection/production methods do not support our ability to work in a combined intelligence environment. Historical examples in this paper will support my claim that in order to succeed with regard to dissemination of intelligence in a coalition environment the COCOM needs to be able to leverage policies to support intelligence sharing; streamline production of intelligence products at the releasable level; and disseminate this information on a robust coalition-wide communications architecture. As a conclusion to this paper I will outline a formula that, if implemented, will mitigate these shortfalls.
Additionally, I will provide a counterargument that addresses major concerns with regard to sharing of intelligence products in coalition environment.
The policies surrounding dissemination of classified military information to foreign governments and organizations are grounded in the Non Disclosure Publication-1. 3 This document is the "Rosetta Stone" that outlines specifically all foreign disclosure and releasablity requirements needed to disseminate classified intelligence in a coalition environment. As such, the document is both thorough and adequate, providing the COCOM foreign dissemination officer (FDO) clear guidance and procedures for the processing of requests to disseminate and disclose information to all non-cleared personnel. At the COCOM level the J2 (Senior Intelligence Officer) is responsible for ensuring that intelligence products are readily available to the Joint Forces Commander and other members of the joint force in a "timely" manner. 4 The J2 delegates this function to the FDO who acts as the J2's representative for all foreign disclosure matters.
Due to the volume of requests and the complexity involved relating to foreign disclosure, the FDO, at the operational level, is neither sufficiently manned nor staffed with the requisite expertise to accomplish this function in a "timely manner." When you consider the rapidity of planning, deployment, and execution of operations, and the compressed decision-making cycle in regard to the complexity/process of downgrading strategic intelligence at the operational level, timely dissemination of intelligence products to our coalition partners is critical towards achieving success on the battlefield. While there are plenty of examples where the FDO facilitates this process during peacetime, the overwhelming response from joint, combined, and component-level intelligence staffs is that in order to facilitate the processing of information sharing in a timely manner, either the policies for disclosure must be changed; the FDO function at the operational level must be made more robust with the capability to downgrade information at the front end;
or the national agencies must produce information at the releasable level, not U.S.-only. be an ineffective intelligence-sharing process.
These three examples will demonstrate that, as we become more reliant on national-level intelligence capabilities versus theater systems and conduct operations with frighteningly fast efficiency, the procedures to disseminate intelligence to our coalition partners become more complex and challenged, especially with regard to the term "timely."
Our ability to provide intelligence products in a coalition environment can be viewed during the Vietnam War with a mixed record of accomplishment. The length of our involvement in the war (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) , and the contributions our coalition partners operational level was robust and positive. Connectivity shortfalls were mitigated by the use of courier, radio, and land line communications. Production of intelligence products was accomplished by combined intelligence teams and staffs and intelligence centers.
Joint/Combined doctrine was established, and agreements were drawn up to facilitate the sharing of information. Production of information was provided at the releasable level to both U.S. and Vietnamese coalition partners and was provided in English and Vietnamese. 8 Additionally, because the current NDP guidelines were not in effect in 1968, and because the majority of strategic intelligence capabilities were focused toward supporting national-level leaders versus support to COCOMs, the sensitivity and dissemination process was less restrictive. This is a critical point, because without the use of strategic intelligence systems, the COCOM commander during this time relied on theater and component assets for intelligence support. Because the majority of operational intelligence production was focused in theater, the COCOM's ability to produce, disseminate, and disclose intelligence could be timely and controlled to meet the needs of the intelligence consumer in theater. The lesson here is that intelligence derived at the operational and tactical level allows for a more "timely" response to intelligence sharing amongst coalition partners at the operational level. Only with the advent of centralized (in side the beltway) intelligence centers providing strategic-level intelligence to the COCOM, does the operational commander encounter complex problems with both disclosing and disseminating information to our coalition partners, because the procedures designed to safeguard national-level products are more restrictive than those involving theater/tactical systems at the operational level. Additionally, the approval process to get a national-level product released is more time-consuming due to the multiple layers of bureaucracy resident outside the COCOM intelligence apparatus.
Twenty years later, the most significant military intelligence event at the operational level occurred during Operation Provide Promise/Joint Endeavor in the former Republic of Yugoslavia (1995-present) . This multinational operation brought together the majority of NATO partners and non-NATO countries including former Soviet Warsaw Pact members, in an effort to provide peace enforcement in BosniaHerzegovina. As such, intelligence support in this environment was challenging because of a number of critical issues, including a non-U.S.-led command structure and its impact on intelligence operations and focus, and a lack of coherent intelligence doctrine to work outside of NATO parameters. Dissemination of intelligence information with regard to communications connectivity, and combined production of intelligence products releasable to coalition partners were all factors that affected intelligence support to our coalition partners during this operation. 9 These challenges were in some ways similar to those encountered during the Vietnam War, but were more complex due to the mission (peace making/enforcement versus combat) and the multitude of coalition partners. In the face of these challenges, U.S.-led intelligence planners developed a clear set of plans and priorities to offset the problems encountered. These included the establishment of "national intelligence support teams/joint field intelligence teams" 10 at both the operational and task force level. During operations in Bosnia, the strategic intelligence organizations (DIA,CIA, NSA) organized and provided to the both the U.S. COCOM in Europe and by the fact that the majority of production that flowed over U.S.
communications systems was produced at a level releasable to coalition partners. While there were limitations in this umbrella organization that included an uneven connectivity at the operational level, validity of information from the U.S. perspective, and security of personnel involved (Russian Battalion), the overall effect was both positive and timely to with regard to dissemination to all coalition members, the mission was static in nature, and the lead-up time was substantial. As we will see during our discussion of OIF, the nature of the mission, area of operations, and execution of the operation will all impact dissemination and disclosure of intelligence to our coalition partners and challenge the notion that we are prepared to conduct intelligence operations in a coalition environment.
The fallout over U.S. intelligence support to coalition operations during OIF is centered on the continued use of U.S.-only information systems, the lack of coalition dissemination architecture, under-utilization of commercial assets, and the impact that speed and success on the battlefield had with regard to the existing dissemination procedures.
The comment on the opening page of this paper is damning considering the scope intelligence picture prior to the war was fairly accurate, but due to the rapid pace and achievement demonstrated during the opening weeks of the conflict, the intelligence system failed to keep pace with actions on the ground from a dissemination viewpoint with our coalition partners. The question needs to be asked, "Did current dissemination policies support our efforts in a coalition environment during OIF?" The answer is twofold. AAR comments after OIF reflect that interoperability between British and U.S.
intelligence planners provided access to planning data and targeting information was accomplished. 24 But that reflections from the U.S. LNO at the joint HQ in London articulated the lack of access to U.S. systems and products and the inordinate amount of time required to get those products through the dissemination process in Washington, D.C. 25 But additional comments note that, once operations commenced, the lack of organic British communications architecture hampered their ability to disseminate intelligence information internal to their forces in theater. 26 The importance of this is that no matter how well you plan leading up to a conflict, not having the necessary tools to disseminate information limits the effectiveness of all prior planning. Unlike operations in Bosnia and Vietnam, U.S. intelligence dissemination policy and production worked fairly well during the conflict in OIF, but a serious lack of common communications Comment: British relied on curriers, radio and single channel satcom to move the bulk of intelligence products, the lack of British ability to move information electronically was slower and less effective than during Gulf War I.
architecture and limited allied communications capability seriously hampered the dissemination of intelligence products to the end user.
As seen in all three case studies, to achieve interoperability and successful intelligence dissemination with our coalition partners, three parameters must be accomplished:
1) establishment of a combined communications architecture to facilitate dissemination of intelligence products;
2) policies must be written to effect dissemination between coalition partners; and 3) intelligence products must be produced and be releasable to our coalition partners.
In the case of Vietnam all three parameters were present for success, but the process took years to develop into a combined intelligence organization. In Bosnia, all three parameters were present, but dissemination of intelligence was only achieved due to the long lead time, static nature of the conflict, and proximity of the AOR to coalition
HQs and fixed communication infrastructure in Europe. In OIF, prior coordination and policies were formulated, but difficulties with regard to access to U.S. communication systems, the lengthy process of downgrading intelligence products in relationship to dissemination, and the compressed planning time line hampered interoperability efforts between the U.S. and Britain. Concurrently, once hostilities commenced during OIF, the communications architecture supporting our coalition partners was inadequate to meet the task of intelligence dissemination.
Clearly, without the ability to downgrade classified information in a timely manner, the FDO at the operational level will be hampered in providing critical information to our coalition partners. My belief is that current policies are effective in providing security with regard to both U.S. intelligence capabilities and accidental disclosure of information. The requirement to improve information sharing must not focus on the rules (NDP-1) designed to safeguard U.S. national level capabilities. Instead the focus of intelligence support to our coalition partners at the operational level must change to include the use of regional/theater/tactical intelligence collection capabilities; the use of commercial intelligence applications; 27 the establishment of permanently manned combined intelligence centers as demonstrated during both in Vietnam and Bosnia; the establishment and funding of a robust coalition communications architecture designed for tactical operations, deployable and compatible with U.S. systems; and the lifting of restrictions with regard to our traditional allies 28 having accesses to U.S.-only systems. These ideas, while taking time and money to accomplish, will also require a generational view that must occur within the intelligence community at the COCOM level in order to facilitate working in a coalition environment. In the short term, in order to support the COCOM FDO, I would recommend an immediate increase of qualified personnel with corresponding skills to ensure that the downgrading of classified information is carried out in the most expeditious manner possible. 29 As an example, I
would require a national intelligence representative (DIA, CIA, NSA) to be available to the COCOM/J2 for this specific purpose. In some cases this model has been adopted, but unfortunately, based on input from the various intelligence leaders at the COCOM level, 30 uniformity of personnel staffing is not consistent and is too often driven by current engagement/op-tempo/crisis events versus long-term management of the problem.
27 Comment: Commercial systems to include satellite imaging, communications, civilian law enforcement products, contracted intelligence analysis. All of these capabilities are available today! 28 Comment: British, Australians, New Zealand, Canada. 29 Hall, Ron, e-mail.
Adopting the above-mentioned ideas would positively impact intelligence dissemination from a operational view in relation to coalition support because they require less in the way of information security, can be tailored at the COCOM level, and ultimately provide a level of information to the COCOM and Coalition partners that is responsive. Without the adoption of these ideas, and given the manner in which we conduct warfare today, continued lack of interoperability with our historic and emerging coalition partners will remain unchanged.
A counterargument to this proposal is that the cost, complexity, and security of U.S. intelligence products and capabilities will be compromised and that the security of foreign intelligence personnel can never truly be verified. My counter to this type of feedback is that we need to focus at the operational level and get away from the thinking on the National/Strategic level with regard to the conduct of operational level intelligence operations. The majority of intelligence information at the COCOM level is geared toward regional issues versus strategic/national level use, and the concern for safeguarding U.S. capabilities, while no less important, is not the same. 31 The execution of planning, timelines, and speed of operations at the COCOM level are such that current dissemination practices are not capable of supporting coalition operations in a "timely manner," and that concerns over security and cost, while valid, do nothing to enhance our ability to work in a coalition environment. Additionally, the costs of not investing in this arena is a further reduction/leveraging of coalition intelligence support, and the wasted 30 Comment: Consistent comment from PACOM/EUCOM/COMPONENT intelligence professionals. 31 In fact dissemination/disclosure and releasability of classified intelligence are govern'd the same, but information derived thru tactical, regional, commercial means can be geared much more effectively with regard to release ability and disclosure at the COCOM level. Avoiding the difficulties with competing priorities, timeliness present when having to go back to the "Beltway" for approval to release national intelligence products.
time required reengineering the current procedures, communication pipes and production methods that exist today.
In conclusion, the requirement to improve our intelligence sharing within a coalition context is well documented today, as well as in the past. 32 The capability to share classified intelligence with our coalition partners requires that we tackle the problem from three fronts including 1) establishing the agreements, policies, and memorandums with our coalition partners that allow for the mutual sharing of intelligence;
2) ensuring that our COCOM organic and national level intelligence production centers produce information at the appropriately releasable level. To facilitate production needed in a coalition environment, information should be collected with regional, theater, and tactical collection assets, thus affording the COCOM/G2 and his theater joint intelligence centers the ability to quickly generate products that can be tailored and releasable; and 3) investing in a coalition communications architecture that is both deployable and responsive to fast-changing operational conditions. The adoption of these ideas will further the COCOM's ability to become interoperable with both traditional and emerging coalition partners. Without improvements in these areas and with the current over-reliance on national-level intelligence, the gulf between coalition intelligence capabilities and our own will only widen, resulting in a continued lack of responsiveness with regard to "timely" intelligence support.
